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INFORMED CONSENT: A MALPRACTICE HEADACHE
I. INTRODUCTION
In my own work I can never quite escape the shadow of malprac-
tice. Although internal medicine has been less plagued by lawsuits than
surgery and its subspecialties, I still live with the subliminal awareness
that every phone call, every "minor" office visit may culminate in a suit.
I live with this consciousness, and the way I practice is subtly
affected by it. It is difficult to distinguish between the thoroughness
and good sense dictated by sound medical practice and that required
to ward oft lawsuits, "yet I think the line can at times be drawn."'
This feeling of frustration belongs to Dr. Michael J. Halberstam of Washing-
ton, D.C., who echoes the sentiments of many members of the medical com-
munity. Until recently, the main concern of the practicing physician was the
proper care and treatment of his patient's illness. Today, however, more and
more doctors are becoming litigation-conscious instead of duty-conscious. 2 The
sharp rise in malpractice cases and the increase in the size of judgments and
settlements have forced many physicians "to practice what they call defensive
medicine, viewing each patient as a potential malpractice claimant."3 Physicians
are accepting less and less responsibility in operations which might entail a risk
of patient injury.4 There is a growing breakdown in the physician-patient
relationship. Dr. Halberstam feels that "medicine, like law, is becoming an
adversary proceeding, with doctor and patient cautiously eyeing each other,
one side alert to signs of error, the other to evidence of contentiousness or dis-
satisfaction. "
One recent development in the field of medical malpractice which certainly
has added to the growing discontent among physicians is the theory of informed
consent. Recovery under this theory is based on the physician's failure to fully
disclose the dangers inherent in the proposed treatment before obtaining the
patient's consent to the procedure involved. The theory is based on the long
standing principle that every person has the right to refuse medical treatment
even though his physician advises him that it is in his best interest to consent.6
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to determine
what shall be done with his own body. . .. "
1 Halberstam, The Doctor's New Dilemma-Will I Be Sued?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1971, at 9.
2 See Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943).
3 Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: the Patient vs. the Physician, Trial Magazine, Feb/
Mar 1970 at 10.
4 Id.
5 Halberstam, supra note 1, at 8. Results of a recent investigation into the increase in
medical malpractice litigation conducted by Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the
Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, also concluded that the physician-patient
relationship was rapidly becoming an adversary proceeding. See generally, Ribicoff, Medical
Malpractice: the Patient v. the Physician, Trial Magazine, Feb/Mar 1970.
6 2 D. Louisell and H. Williams, Medical Malpractice, II 22,01 (1969).
7 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125 at 128, 105 N.E. 92 at
93 (1914).
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While the theory of informed consent has given physicians cause for addi-
tional concern, it has also brought about a great deal of controversy in legal
circles. Numerous questions about the topic have been raised with much dis-
cussion about possible answers. The main problems center around two areas:
(1) the nature of the tort action-battery or negligence; and (2) adequate
disclosure by the physician-the requirements necessary to satisfy his legal obli.
gation to the patient. The purpose of this comment is to analyze these problems
and to review the solutions offered in recent court decisions.
II. NATURE OF THE TORT-BATTERY OR NEGLIGENCE
Informed consent arose from a number of early cases in which the patient
never consented at all to the medical treatment. The leading case is Mohr v.
Williams.s In Mohr the plaintiff had consented to an operation on her right ear.
While under the influence of anesthetics, the defendant doctor examined her left
ear and found it in worse condition than the right. The doctor then performed
the operation on the left ear. The court held that since the defendant performed
the operation on the left ear without the plaintiff's consent, his unauthorized
act, even though it was free from negligence, was wrongful and constituted
battery on her person.9 The court also noted that, unlike a criminal action,
unlawful intent need not be shown. It was sufficient to prove that the operation
was performed without consent.' 0
In the years following the Mohr decision, most courts which handled similar
cases involving lack of consent followed the battery theory. In Pratt v. Davis"
the Illinois Supreme Court held it was a trespass to the person. Other court de-
cisions, citing the soundness of the rule in Mohr, held it was a technical assault
and battery.' 2 The eminent Justice Cardozo, while sitting on the bench of the
Court of Appeals of New York, commented on the matter in the case of Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital.'8 He said, "a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable
in damages.'
4
Some legal scholars claim the cause of action based on a battery in these
cases is not totally acceptable because in traditional battery cases the defendant
usually acts out of malice. 15 The argument often posed is that the physician is
acting in good faith for the betterment of his patient.16 But the fact remains,
whether the doctor is acting in good faith or not, treating the patient without
8 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
9 Id. at 271, 104 N.W. at 16.
10 Id.
11 224 IL. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
12 Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913); Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 P. 363
(1927).
13 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
14 Id. at 128, 105 N.E. at 93.
15 McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 Minn.
L Rev. 381 (1957).
16 Id. at 424.
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having obtained the necessary consent is wrongful. The unlawful touching of a
person's body is a battery. 17 Therefore, in situations where there is no consent
whatsoever and where there is a limited consent which is violated, the battery
theory is entirely satisfactory.
The real problem is presented when the patient has given his consent to the
treatment specified without having been informed of the dangers involved. Here
the feasibility of the battery theory can be questioned and the necessity of in-
formed consent becomes applicable. The courts have differed in their handling
of cases predicated on the informed consent theory. Some hold that when the
physician does not provide sufficient information, the patient's consent is negated
and therefore a technical battery is committed on the plaintiff.' 8 Other jurisdic-
tions grant relief under a theory of negligence. These courts hold it is the
doctor's duty to disclose pertinent facts about the procedure to the patient.
Failure on the part of the physician to provide this information is deemed to be
negligence on his part. 19
One case in which the court applied the battery theory was Bowers v.
Talmage.20 In Bowers the injured plaintiff was a nine year old boy who suffered
from seizures or spells. His parents took him to Dr. Von Storch, a neurologist,
who was in doubt whether the boy's trouble was emotional or organic. The
doctor suggested that an arteriogram (an exploratory surgical process) be
performed. Evidence was presented which tended to show that Dr. Von Storch
did not inform the boy's parents of the dangers of the operation. Three per cent
of such operations were known to result in death, and other surgery of this
type could result in paralysis. After his operation the plaintiff suffered from
partial paralysis. The court held that the evidence presented an issue for the
jury regarding the material question of whether informed consent for the opera-
tion was obtained from the parents. The court went on to say, "Unless a person
who gives consent to an operation knows its dangers and the degree of danger,
a consent does not represent a choice and is ineffectual."
'2 1
Another case in which the patient based his recovery on an alleged battery was
Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital.22 Although the court did not specifically
label the plaintiff's case as involving informed consent, this was the main issue
presented by the facts. The plaintiff was having urinary trouble and sought his
physician's advice on the matter. After initial examination, Dr. Foley recom-
mended that the plaintiff be admitted to the Charles T. Miller Hospital for
further investigation into his condition with a view to performing a prostate
17 W. Prosser, Law of Torts p. 34 (3d ed. 1964).
18 Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) ; Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz.
App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965).
19 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied with clarification,
187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960) ; Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
20 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).
21 Id. at 889.
22 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
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operation if further examination revealed this was necessary. After being ad.
mitted to the hospital and going through further tests, the plaintiff was told by
Dr. Foley a prostate operation was required. From that moment forward, ac-
cording to evidence presented by the plaintiff, Dr. Foley never informed his
patient that part of the prostate operation involved cutting his spermatic cords,
thus making him sterile. During his testimony, Dr. Foley revealed that he could
not remember if he had told the plaintiff about the cutting of the spermatic cords.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in reversing the lower court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's action held that the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury
to decide. While the court made no specific comment as to the validity of the
consent, the reference to the Mohr decision and other cases decided on a battery
theory implied that if there had not been an evidentiary question the court would
have negated the consent and held the defendant liable for assault and battery.
In Woods v. Brumlop2s the physician failed to give full and frank dis-
closure of all pertinent facts to the patient before being granted consent to go
ahead with the prescribed treatment. The court stated that without proper dis-
closure any consent which was attained would be ineffectual. 24 In Shetter v.
Rochelle 5 the court held that a consent to a surgical procedure is valid if the
consenting party "understands substantially the nature of the surgical procedure
attempted and the probable results of the operation. This as a matter of law
constitutes an informed consent. Lacking this the operation is a battery.126 In
Scott v. Wilson27 the plaintiff consented to an operation which was supposed to
restore his impaired hearing. The court held that the physician was required to
warn the plaintiff of known hazards and chances of favorable or unfavorable
results. Without such information, the consent given is of no effect and the
physician is guilty of battery. 28 In situations where consent was induced by
false representations, the courts have held that such consent is not valid and that
a battery was committed on the person.
29
In choosing the cause of action, whether it be battery, negligence, or
both, the plaintiff should be aware of the differences in pleading and proof
between the two theories. If the complaint is based solely on a battery theory,
then it would make no difference that the defendant performed the treatment with
skill and care because he lacked the consent necessary to undertake the operation
in the first place. "The gist of the action for battery is not the hostile intent of the
defendant, but rather the absence of consent to the conduct on the part of
the plaintiff." °30 Furthermore, the plaintiff need not prove any harm or actual
23 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
24 Id. at 227, 377 P.2d at 524.
25 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965).
26 Id. at 374, 409 P.2d at 86.
27 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
28 Id. at 538.
29 Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) ; Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260
N.W. 448.
30 W. Prosser, Law of Torts p. 35 (3d ed. 1964).
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damage in an action for battery,31 while in a negligence action actual damage
must be shown.
82
The plaintiff in a malpractice suit for negligence must prove that the
defendant failed to exercise that degree of skill and care that is possessed by
members of the profession in good standing.3 Expert testimony must be pro-
vided, in the absence of which there can be no finding of negligence.3 4 Whereas,
in an action brought on a battery theory expert testimony may not be required.35
The plaintiff in a negligence action must also show that the injury in question
was proximately caused by the act or omission of the defendant. 86
An illustration of the different results which may come about depending
on the choice of remedy is found in Hunt v. Bradshaw." In Hunt the plaintiff
predicated his malpractice action on a negligence theory and was denied re-
covery. The testimony at the trial established that while the plaintiff was working
in an auto repair shop a small piece of steel broke off the end of an automobile
axle under a sledge-hammer blow and penetrated the body of the plaintiff,
entering the left front side of his neck just above the collarbone. After an
initial examination, Dr. Bradshaw recommended to the plaintiff that the metal
fragment be removed by surgery. The plaintiff questioned Dr. Bradshaw about
the seriousness of the operation and was told it was a simple one, that there was
nothing to it. The plaintiff then consented to the operation. During surgery,
however, Dr. Bradshaw could not locate the small fragment in order to remove
it. In addition to this failure, the plaintiff's left arm became completely paralyzed
as a result of the operation. Expert testimony at-trial established that this type of
exploratory operation was indeed difficult due to the small size of the foreign
matter. Testimony also established that partial paralysis could result from such
an operation. The plaintiff alleged that the doctor was negligent, not that he
was deficient in his skill or ability as a surgeon, but that he was not reasonably
diligent in applying his medical knowledge in advising plaintiff about the nature
of the operation and possible consequences. The court concluded that the opera-
tion was definitely of a serious nature. But, while the opinion questioned Dr.
Bradshaw's wisdom in withholding certain information, it did not hold that his
conduct constituted negligence. His "failure to explain the risk involved, there-
fore, may be considered a mistake on the part of the surgeon, but under the
facts cannot be deemed such want of ordinary care as to import liability."8 8
81 Id.
32 Id. at 146.
33 See Hams v. Graham, 124 Okla. 196, 255 P. 710 (1926) ; Butter v. Rule, 29 Ariz.
405, 242 P. 436 (1926). See also W. Prosser, Law of Torts p. 165 (3rd ed. 1964).
34 See Beane v. Perley, 99 N.H. 309, 109 A.2d 848 (1954); Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz.
416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938). See also W. Prosser, Law of Torts p. 167 (3rd ed. 1964).
a5 See Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962). The court in Woods held
that expert testimony was not required to prove lack of an informed consent.
86 W. Prosser, Law of Torts p. 146 (3d ed. 1964).
87 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
88 Id. at 523, 88 S.E.2d at 766.
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. The concurring opinion in the Hunt case agreed that the cause of action
based on negligence should fail. However, if the plaintiff had charged Dr. Brad-
shaw with battery, Justice Bobbitt hinted that this cause of action might have
succeeded. He said:
True, plaintiff alleges that when defendant recommended that the
operation be performed, defendant negligently represented to him that
the "operation was a simple one which entailed and involved no danger
to the plaintiff's health and body" and that "but for said representations
* . . the plaintiff would not have submitted to said operation." But
plaintiff did not allege that said representations were false to the
knowledge of the defendant or other facts that might nullify his consent
to the operation. In short, plaintiff's action is not for assault and
battery, or trespass to the person, predicated upon allegations of an un-
authorized operation.3 9
A number of other cases based on a negligence theory have treated the
question as one involving professional standards of conduct.40 In Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees41 the court held that a physician
who withholds information which is necessary to form the basis of an "intelligent
consent ' 42 violates his duty as a physician. In Mitchell v. Robinson48 the plaintiff
submitted to insulin shock therapy and as a result of this treatment suffered
compression fractures of the spine. Plaintiff later claimed that if he had been
informed of the risks involved in the treatment he would not have consented.
The court held that since this was a relatively new procedure the doctor owed
his patient the duty to inform him of the possible serious hazards.44 In Natanson
v. Kline45 the Kansas Supreme Court held that the lower court's failure to in-
struct the jury on the obligation of the physician to disclose to the patient the
dangers incident to radioactive cobalt therapy constituted reversible error. In
DiFilippo v. Preston4" plaintiff claimed that the defendant was under a duty
to disclose possible harmful results of a thyroidectomy. 47 Expert medical testi-
mony at trial established the fact that it was not the practice of surgeons in the
area to warn patients of the possibility of resultant injury from a thyroidectomy.
The court, relying on this testimony, held that there was no duty of disclosure
because it was not the practice of local physicians to inform patients in such
situations. Since the outcome in the DiFilippo case depended upon the practice
39 Id. at 524, 88 S.E.2d at 767.
40 See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), rehearing denied with
clarification, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960) ; Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965) ;
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 CaL App. 2d 560 317 P.2d
170 (1957).
41 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
42 Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
43 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
44 Id. at 19.
45 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), rehearing denied with clarification, 187 Kan.
196, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
46 173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961).
47 Gould's Medical Dictionary defines a thyroidectomy as an excision of the thyroid
gland.
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of the physicians in the particular community involved, the court apparently
did not recognize the physician's duty to disclose as the overriding factor in
informed consent cases.
In Green v. Hussey4" the appellate court of the State of Illinois was for the
first time confronted with the theory of informed consent. The result of the
case is significant in that the plaintiff sought recovery mainly under a theory of
battery, while the defendant argued the failure of the plaintiff to prove a cause
of action in negligence. In Green the plaintiff consented to the removal of a
malignant tumor from her breast. Following the operation she was turned over
to the hospital's radiology department for radiation therapy. As a result of this
treatment plaintiff claimed her heart and right lung were damaged. She also
denied giving her consent to the treatment alleging that she was never informed
of the hazards of this procedure. In her complaint the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's failure to inform her of the risks involved in cobalt therapy con-
stituted a failure to obtain the necessary consent. Plaintiff also included in her
complaint the duty to disclose argument based on a negligence theory. She
alleged that the defendant breached his duty by not informing her of the
hazards of the proposed treatment.
One of the requirements in malpractice cases, in the absence of which the
plaintiff cannot prove negligence, is the giving of expert medical testimony.49
The defendant in Green, after noting there were no cases involving informed
consent in Illinois, stated that the plaintiff had failed to offer the expert testimony
required in order to sustain the cause of action. Citing Aiken v. Clary50 as
authority for his claim that cases involving informed consent should be dealt
with under a negligence theory, the defendant in his answer (and the appellate
court in its opinion) quoted a passage from that case which required the giving
of expert testimony:
[W]e hold that plaintiff, in order to sustain his burden of proof, is
required to offer expert testimony to show what disclosures a reasonable
medical practitioner, under the same or similar circumstances, would
have made, or stated another way, that the disclosures as made by the
defendant do not meet the standard of what a reasonable medical prac-
titioner would have disclosed under the same or similar circum-
stances. 51
The Illinois appellate court affirmed the lower court's directed verdict for
the defendant. According to the opinion, not only had the plaintiff failed to pro.
vide the necessary expert testimony, but she failed to prove that the defendant's
actions were the proximate cause of her injury.52 Consciously or subconsciously,
the court in reaching its decision could have been affected by the drastic rise
48 127 I1. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970).
49 W. Prosser, Law of Torts p. 165 (3d ed. 1964).
50 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
51 Id. at 675.
52 127 11L App. 2d at 184-185, 262 N.E.2d at 161.
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in malpractice suits in that it required expert medical testimony when this may
not have been necessary. If at the outset the plaintiff never consented to the
radiation therapy, then expert testimony on the nature of the treatment might
not even be pertinent because permission to proceed with the therapy had not
been obtained in the first place.
The Illinois appellate court's opinion in Green was unclear regarding the
disposition of the plaintiff's complaint of lack of consent to the treatment. The
court apparently felt no need to discuss the question of consent in light of the
lack of expert medical testimony. No distinction between recovery predicated on
a battery theory or negligence concept, such as was pointed out in the concurring
opinion in Hunt v. Bradshaw,53 was noted in the Green case. The court reviewed
the case entirely under a negligence theory and seemed more concerned with
the inadequate disclosure element than with the specific underlying theory of
recovery based on both battery and negligence.
III. ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE
Whether recovery is predicated on a battery theory, negligence concept, or
both, the essential element which the plaintiff must prove is that the information
provided by the physician fell short of the disclosure required to provide an
informed consent. There is no measuring stick which can be applied to each
case to determine if the information provided by the physician was sufficient.
The particular facts and circumstances must govern the finding. In emergency
situations, for example, the physician need not stop to disclose pertinent facts
to the injured party. The doctor is justified in proceeding with the treatment on
the assumption that the patient would consent if he were able.5 4
The problem of adequate disclosure was discussed in the case of Salgo v.
Leland Stanford fr. University Board of Trustees.55 While the major issue in
the opinion was the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the guide-
lines set forth relating to adequate disclosure are noteworthy. The plaintiff in
Salgo was suffering from a serious circulatory disturbance which was caused
by a blockage in the abdominal aorta. His physician recommended corrective
surgery, but as evidence produced at trial demonstrated, the procedure and
possible dangers therefrom were not explained to the plaintiff. As a result of the
operation the plaintiff suffered permanent paralysis of his lower extremities.
In discussing the physician's duty to inform and what specifically constitutes
adequate disclosure the court said:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis
of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.
53 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
54 See Luka v. Lowie, 171 Mich. 127, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Wells v. McGehee, 39
So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1949) ; Jackovack v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
55 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Likewise the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a
procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the
same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above
all else and this very fact places him in a position in which he some-
times must choose between two alternative courses of action. One is to
explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure
or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in alarming
a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may as a result
refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it
may also result in actually increasing the risks by reason of the
physiological results of the apprehension itself. The other is to recog-
nize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the patient's
mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may
be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount
of discretion must be employed consistent with full disclosure of facts
necessary to an informed consent .... "
The statement above encompasses many of the situations under which a
question of adequate disclosure may arise. Initially, the court states that com-
plete disclosure of any facts pertinent to the procedure is necessary. Then this
position is qualified. The court realizes that complete disclosure would not be
medically advisable under certain circumstances. A stricter standard which
could be deduced from this statement is that there must be a full disclosure of
known dangers unless a particular patient's emotional condition requires a more
limited disclosure.
Three years after the Salgo decision, the Kansas Supreme Court set its
standard for adequate disclosure in Natanson v. Kline.57 The court held the
physician was obligated to make a "reasonable disclosure"58 to the patient of
the nature and probable consequences of the suggested treatment. Comparing
the reasonableness theory set forth in Natanson with the standard established in
Salgo, it can be said the two theories are basically compatible. The Natanson
court was really simplifying the language set forth in Salgo. The unfortunate
aspect of the reasonableness approach is that it provides no definitive guide-
lines, and requires a case by case analysis. But, any attempt to set a more rigid
standard in light of the drastic rise in malpractice cases could hamper the
physician in his effort to cure the patient.
The reasonable disclosure standard has been adopted by several jurisdic-
tions which have dealt with informed consent cases.5 9 The Missouri Supreme
Court adopted this standard in Aiken v. Clary.60 There the plaintiff claimed he
consented to insulin shock therapy without having been informed of the hazards
56 Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
57 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), rehearing denied with clarification, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
58 186 Kan. at 410, 359 P.2d at 1107.
59 See Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221,
377 P.2d 520 (1962).
60 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
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involved. As a result of the treatment plaintiff suffered organic brain damage.
As part of his defense to charges of lack of an informed consent, Dr. Clary
raised an issue which should be included by every physician in his answer to
charges of malpractice based on informed consent. Defendant clamied that even
if the patient was informed of the risks involved he still would have consented
to the treatment. The court in taking notice of this contention said, "[I]f the
jury was convinced from all the evidence that a more complete disclosure would
have made no difference to plaintiff, and that he still would have consented to
the therapy or procedure, then plaintiff has not established a right of recovery."
6 1
The court in this instance was recognizing the importance of the plaintiff's
attitude and state of mind at the time of the original consent. While the recog-
nition of the importance of the plaintiff's attitude may be questionable since
it mainly depends upon hindsight, still there is merit in the conclusion. If the
plaintiff had been fully informed of possible injuries and later admitted that
he still would have consented to the treatment, then he should be made to abide
by his original decision consenting to the therapy.
The Aiken case also clarified the matter concerning the need for expert
testimony in informed consent cases. The plaintiff in Aiken, relying on the
Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Robinson,6 2 did not produce
expert testimony in support of his case. The court, after expressing disapproval
of its earlier decision in Mitchell, held that such testimony was required in
informed consent cases. The opinion stated that matters involving surgery or
treatment are normally not within the common knowledge of an ordinary juror.6 3
The court also stated that lack of adequate disclosure was comparable to negli-
gence in other malpractice cases which always require expert testimony.
64
Most courts have concurred with the Aiken decision. 65 In Woods v. Brom.
lop,66 however, the New Mexico Supreme Court held there was no need for
expert testimony in informed consent cases. In Woods the defendant advised
the plaintiff to submit to electroshock treatments. The plaintiff consented, then
later complained that as a result of the treatment she suffered a loss of hearing.
First, she alleged that Dr. Bromlop failed to inform her of the risks involved
in the treatment. Second, she claimed that after having asked the doctor directly
about the possibility of harmful results, she was told that no serious consequences
would occur. At trial, the plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony which
would have established what medically constituted adequate disclosure in her
case. On this matter the court said, "Under the circumstances of this case, a
fact issue was presented for determination by the jury upon which there was no
61 Id. at 676.
62 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
05 Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 at 674 (Mo. 1965).
64 Id.
65 See DiFilippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961) ; Williams v. Menahan, 191 Kan.
6, 879 P.2d 292 (1963); Green v. Hussey, 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970).
66 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
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necessity for expert medical testimony. '6 7 While the court did limit the scope
of the statement to the facts presented in this particular case, it was nevertheless
resolved that expert testimony is not an absolute requirement in informed con-
sent cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
A standard of disclosure has been developed in informed consent cases
which is both necessary and proper. If each individual is truly the final arbiter
in decisions involving his health and livelihood, then it must follow that he is
entitled to be provided with sufficient information to help him reach any decision
vital to his health. It is not unreasonable to ask a physician to take the time and
patience to explain the risks of the proposed treatment to his patient. In cases
involving chance of death or serious permanent injury in which the immediate
life of the patient is not in danger, complete disclosure should be required.
When disclosure of risks of treatment may hinder the patient's chance for re-
covery, physicians can reasonably conclude that details need not be furnished'
and treatment can be administered.
In dealing with cases involving informed consent the courts have accepted
theories of recovery based on both battery and negligence. The essential element
which the plaintiff must prove, whether recovery is predicated on a battery
theory, negligence concept, or both, is that the information provided by the
physician fell short of the disclosure required to provide an informed consent.
The normal response of any party injured by the acts or omissions of
another is to seek reparations. This is especially likely to occur in the case of a
person who made an important decision based upon the advice of one whom
he trusted and later discovered that he was not told all the pertinent facts. This
is the problem of every patient who, in retrospect, must consider whether the
consent he gave was informed.
GEORGE PAPPAS
67 Id. at 229, 377 P.2d at 525.
